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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-3120 
___________ 
 
 JOHN J. GABRYS, JR., 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-12-cv-06099) 
District Judge:  Honorable Robert F. Kelly 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 19, 2015 
Before:  FUENTES, SHWARTZ and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: November 2, 2015 ) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                                                
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, John Gabrys appeals from the judgment 
of the District Court affirming the denial of his claim for disability benefits.  For the 
reasons set forth below, we will affirm. 
I. 
 In March 2011, Gabrys applied for disability insurance benefits, alleging that he 
was disabled as of February 2010, when he was severely injured at work.  Gabrys suffers 
from extreme back pain and other symptoms.  His first disability claim was denied 
initially and on reconsideration.  Gabrys then requested review by an Administrative Law 
Judge (“ALJ”), and in January 2012 he had a hearing on his claim, at which he was 
represented by counsel.  On February 9, 2012, the ALJ denied Gabrys’s claim in a written 
opinion, and the Appeals Council later denied Gabrys’s request for review. 
 Gabrys then sought review pro se in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  While his federal action was pending, Gabrys prevailed 
on a separate disability benefits claim, but this claim applied only to the period after the 
ALJ denied his first claim, that is, February 10, 2012, onward.  Gabrys argued that this 
later award of disability benefits showed that he should have prevailed in his first claim.  
The District Court rejected this argument and denied Gabrys’s claim and his request for 
reconsideration.  Gabrys timely appealed. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “The role of this Court is 
identical to that of the District Court, namely to determine whether there is substantial 
evidence to support the Commissioner’s decision.”  Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 
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(3d Cir. 1999); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).  Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla,” 
and is defined as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 
adequate.”  Plummer, 186 F.3d at 427 (quotation marks omitted); accord Chandler v. 
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir. 2011).  If the ALJ’s factual findings are 
supported by substantial evidence, we, like the District Court, are bound by those 
findings, even if we would have decided them differently.  Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 
358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 To qualify for disability benefits, an applicant must demonstrate that he is “unable 
to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has 
lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.”  
42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A).  Further, the applicant’s physical or mental impairments 
must be “of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, 
considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of 
substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.”  Id. § 1382c(a)(3)(B). 
 A five-step evaluation is used to determine whether an applicant is disabled.  20 
C.F.R. § 404.1520.  The ALJ must determine: (1) whether the applicant has engaged in 
substantial gainful activity since the alleged disability onset date; (2) whether the 
applicant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the 
impairment or combination of impairments meets the criteria of a listed impairment; (4) 
whether, despite the severe impairment, the applicant retains the residual functional 
capacity to perform past relevant work; and (5) whether the applicant is capable of 
4 
 
performing other jobs that exist in the national economy, considering his age, education, 
work experience, and residual functional capacity.  Id. § 404.1520(a)(4); Poulos v. 
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 474 F.3d 88, 91-92 (3d Cir. 2007).  However, if the ALJ 
determines that an applicant is not disabled before proceeding through all five steps, he 
need not analyze the remaining steps.  20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). 
 The ALJ thoroughly evaluated Gabrys’s claim against the record evidence and 
concluded that Gabrys was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act.  
Specifically, the ALJ concluded that: (1) Gabrys had not engaged in substantial gainful 
activity since his alleged onset date; (2) Gabrys’s degenerative disc disease and carpal 
tunnel syndrome were severe impairments, but his other physical and mental impairments 
were not severe; (3) Gabrys did not have an impairment or combination of impairments 
that met the criteria of a listed impairment; (4) Gabrys had the residual functional 
capacity to perform light work with the option to sit or stand, but was unable to perform 
any past relevant work; and (5) Gabrys was able to perform jobs that exist in significant 
numbers in the national economy.  As such, the ALJ denied his disability claim. 
 In his appellate brief and reply, Gabrys does not challenge any of the ALJ’s 
specific findings or procedures.  Rather, he argues, as he did in the District Court, that 
because he prevailed in a later disability claim, he should have prevailed in his first 
claim.  This argument fails because our review is limited to the evidence in the record at 
the time the ALJ rendered his decision.  See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).  As such, post-decision 
developments, including subsequent disability awards, do not undermine the ALJ’s 
conclusions because “evidence that was not before the ALJ cannot be used to argue that 
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the ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence.”  Matthews v. Apfel, 239 
F.3d 589, 594 (3d Cir. 2001).  Further, as the Commissioner notes, “the possibility of 
drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an 
administrative agency’s finding from being supported by substantial evidence.”  Consolo 
v. Fed. Maritime Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966).  Accordingly, Gabrys’s reliance on 
his subsequent disability award, without more, does not undermine the ALJ’s decision. 
III. 
 Gabrys offers no other basis to conclude that the ALJ’s decision is not supported 
by substantial evidence, and our review of the record reveals none.  We will therefore 
affirm the judgment of the District Court.  In light of our disposition, Gabrys’s motions 
for appointment of counsel are denied as moot. 
